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Abstract: A standard criticism to processual approaches, however, is that they 
foreclose the constitutive dimension of power and, in consequence, shy away 
from engaging with the political. In order to show the political relevance of those 
more sociologically oriented approaches to the “international,” this paper will 
discuss two specific problems that are central to contemporary IR theories 
interested by the identity/alterity nexus: collective political identity formation 
and politics of representation. This will permit to show how a processual 
approach to the “international” can provide for a more politically comprehensive 
reading of certain phenomenon. In order to do so, I will discuss these two 
problems through some aspects of Mikhail Bakhtin’s work centred on the 
identity/alterity nexus. This will be done by questioning the limitations of the 
dichotomy between social and corporate identity in IR theories. Empirically, 
these limitations will be highlighted by discussing the variety of constellations of 
collective political identities that have informed questions regarding 
multiculturalism spanning from the Tokugawa (1603-1867) to the Taishō (1912-
1926) eras in Japan. The political dimension behind processual approaches of 
the “international” will emerge precisely in discussing how complex 
“expression[s] of a particular structure of power relations” (Mouffe 2005: 18) 
have to be described through a framework that cannot be circumscribed to 
either the corporate or the social dimension of a social continuant’s identity 
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From Process to Politics1 
 
 
Sciences of the spirit [i.e. the humanities]; their field of 
inquiry is not one but two ‘spirits’ (the studied and the 
person who studies, which must not be merged into one 
spirit). The real object of study is the interrelation and 
interaction of ‘spirits.’  
Mikhail M. Bakhtin (1986 [1970-71]: 144)  
 
While still remaining a marginal conceptualisation of the “international”, 
process-based approaches provide a fresh and promising heuristic to go beyond 
a spatial conceptualisation of the “international” and to focus our gaze on 
practices and the processes constituting it (Guillaume 2007, see as well Agnew 
2005). Indeed, the key idea of a process-based approach basically lies in the 
prioritisation of process over substance, relation over separateness, and activity 
over passivity. A standard criticism to processual approaches, however, is that 
they foreclose the constitutive dimension of power and, in consequence, shy 
away from engaging with the political, with what Chantal Mouffe refers to as “the 
very way in which society is instituted” (2005: 9). In order to show the political 
relevance of those more sociologically oriented approaches to the 
“international,” this paper will discuss two specific problems that are central to 
contemporary IR theories interested by the identity/alterity nexus: collective 
political identity formation and politics of representation. This will permit to 
show how a processual approach to the “international” can provide for a more 
politically comprehensive reading of certain phenomenon. In order to do so, 
from a processual perspective, I will discuss these two problems through some 
aspects of Mikhail Bakhtin’s work centred on the identity/alterity nexus. 
                                                        
1 I would like to thank Charlotte Epstein, Matteo Gianni, Vivenne Jabri and Ces Moore and IPS’ 
anonymous reviewers, who commented on an earler and radically different draft, for their 
remarks, engagements and encouragements. 
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Naturally, Bakhtin’s work does not constitute the sole path to a process-based 
approach to the “international,” but is one among a vast array of possibilities. 
Thus, one is entitled to ask why Bakhtin is to be taken into account, at all, as an 
interlocutor for thinking about the political dimension of the “international”2. 
Indeed, Bakhtin’s work, by its variety and changing nature, its “unstable kind of 
unity” to use the felicitous term of Gary S. Morson and Caryl Emerson (1990: 2), 
proves to be a tricky and difficult body to cohere into what one would term a 
“Bakhtinian approach” to the “international”; the question of the relevance of his 
thought to think about the political dimension of the “international” is thus 
looming. A first answer is that what at best can be achieved seems to be a sound 
and issue specific transposition of some of his articulations or concepts where, in 
the case of this contribution, they might provide for a reflection about ways to 
approach the “international” along processual lines. A twofold justification of the 
use of Bakhtin in IR theory emerges from this. 
First, from an ontological and epistemic perspective, Bakhtin’s work can be at 
least partially related to a processual, or one might say trans-actionist, approach 
of the relations between a “self” and an “other,” a framework that has a strong 
heuristic potential for the field of international relations (for an earlier 
treatment, see Guillaume 2002, 2006, 2007; Neumann 1996). Following Mustafa 
Emirbayer (1997: 287, Dewey & Bentley, 1991 [1949]: 101-102), one can say 
that trans-actionist approaches are approaches for which “the very terms or 
units involved in a transaction derive their meaning, significance, and identity 
from the (changing) functional roles they play within that transaction. The later, 
seen as a dynamic, unfolding process, becomes the primary unit of analysis 
rather than the constituent elements themselves.” Second, from a more practical 
and methodological perspective, some of Bakhtin’s key conceptual articulations 
are centred on the creation and articulation of boundaries between identity and 
alterity in their transgredient relations, thus resulting practically and, at times, 
ethically in a trans-action of viewpoints. This is a particularly heuristic 
                                                        
2 On Bakhtin’s life, work and concepts in general one can refer to the work of Michael Brandist, 
Katerina Clark, Caryl Emerson, Michael Holquist, Gary Saul Morson, or Tzvetan Todorov (see 
Brandist 2002, Clark & Holquist, 1984; Emerson, 1997; Holquist, 1990; Morson & Emerson, 1990; 
Todorov, 1981). 
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theoretical ground to start thinking about the processual dimensions of the 
“international”. 
This will be done by questioning, through the Bakhtinian notion of dialogue, the 
limitations of both the explicit and, often implicit, dichotomy between social and 
corporate identity in IR theories. These dimensions will be highlighted by 
discussing the variety of constellations of collective political identities that have 
informed questions regarding multiculturalism, here taken simply both as a 
social fact and as a policy, spanning from the Tokugawa (1603-1867) to the 
Taishō (1912-1926) eras in Japan. It will thus be shown that processual 
approaches are key to move beyond the corporate/social divide at the heart of 
most approaches to the identity/alterity nexus in IR and thus to refine, from the 
standpoint of political and social theory, our understanding of the mechanisms 
informing the trans-actions between identity and alterity. The political 
dimension behind processual approaches of the “international” will emerge 
precisely in discussing how complex “expression[s] of a particular structure of 
power relations” (Mouffe 2005: 18) have to be described through a framework 
that cannot be circumscribed to either the corporate or the social dimension of a 
social continuant’s identity3. Before doing so, however, I will begin this 
contribution by discussing the reasons why Bakhtin’s notion of dialogue is a 
relevant starting point to discuss the question of the political in IR. 
From dialogic to dialogical international relations: the place of the political 
To start this discussion, it is important I believe to distinguish between what one 
could term dialogic approaches and dialogical approaches to the “international”. 
Dialogic approaches refer to the idea of dialogue as an exchange between 
interlocutors and concentrates on the normative problem of reciprocity and 
recognition. Dialogical approaches focus rather on the characterization of the 
processes, the trans-actions at the heart of any forms of identity formation, 
performance or transformation, whatever the normative qualification these 
forms might take (see Guillaume 2002, 2007, Nielsen, 2002: 35, 214n11)4. While, 
                                                        
3 On the notion of social continuant, see Guillaume 2007. 
4 It is important to note that there naturally are normative issues and developments in Bakhtin’s 
work, both dialogic and dialogical moments are to be seen in his work; those have been at the 
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at first glance, it seems that the former logically includes the latter; it is not 
necessarily the case. Indeed, Charles Taylor notes when he discusses the notion 
of dialogue in Bakhtin that: “we need relationships to fulfil, but not to define, 
ourselves” (1994: 33), this pertains to a dialogic understanding of dialogue, if 
one can say, whereas a dialogical approach sees relations, in conjunction with 
contexts and expressions, as necessary to define ourselves (Guillaume 2002, 
2007). This distinction is important because it opens up the question of the 
political in IR theory in those approaches interested in the identity/alterity 
nexus and the potential of a processual approach to the “international.” 
For different authors within IR scholarship that have sought to address the 
normative questions behind the identity/alterity nexus, the dominant 
approaches to international relations, either through logical economism (Ashley 
1983: 471-473) or a logical rationalism, have denied the complexity of questions 
at the core of the nexus and thus have affirmed the principle of uniformity, and 
its corollary of assimilation, over the variety and multiplicity of points of view 
existing or striving to be heard in the world. By negating the intersubjective 
quality of this variety of voices, these dominant approaches have, to a large 
extent, refused to recognise that notions such as identity or alterity represent a 
“field of possibilities” with political, cultural and sometimes vital implications 
(see Doty 1996: 340-341). To take but one example of this link between the 
political and alterity, David Campbell notes that the political, even more so by its 
“international” dimension, is marked by the “multiplicity of others” (Campbell 
1999: 36); the social fact of this multiplicity and its normative underpinnings set 
alterity as the standard by which the ethical and the political have to be 
reconsidered most notably, in Campbell’s work, through the tool of 
deconstruction that reflects the “necessities of politics per se, necessities that can 
be contested and negotiated, but not escaped or transcended” (Campbell 1999: 
51). The idea that the political cannot be “escaped or transcended” is one reason 
why some aspects of Bakhtin’s work might appeal to IR scholarship interested in 
bringing a more processual conception of the “international” in. Let’s now turn to 
this potential appeal. 
                                                                                                                                                              
heart of some contemporary reflections about social and political theory (see Hirschkop, 1999; 
Nielsen, 2002). 
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First, it is useful to typify the use of Bakhtin’s concepts and framework can be 
typified in roughly two categories within IR literature5. There has been, first and 
primarily, a citatory and, often, cursory use of Bakhtin’s work and concepts. This 
has actually been the main criticism of Bakhtin’s uses in IR literature (see 
Holden, 2003: 243-251). One can therefore distinguish those who “cite Bakhtin,” 
however accurately, and those who actually are trying a way or another to 
formalize elements of his thought. Most notably among those who tend to rapidly 
cite Bakhtin there is the idea that he anticipated many features of 
poststructuralist or postmodernist theories, most notably that he was somehow 
“ahead of his time” in relation to what we now term “the linguistic turn” and a 
de-centred, contingent perspective on subjectivities. Those affinities with the 
“post” movement, however, cannot allow, far from it, his assimilation to 
poststructural or postmodernist theories (see Gardiner & Bell, 1998: 4-7). 
Moreover, Bakhtin pertains to a certain modern sense of alterity, a “humanism of 
alterity” to use Augusto Ponzio’s term. What characterizes Bakhtin’s take on 
alterity, alongside Emanuel Lévinas’s, for Ponzio is an “individuation of alterity in 
the sphere of the self,” which is not to say that alterity is assimilated to the self, 
but that alterity is “a constitutive obstacle to the closure, to the unity and 
integrity of the egologic sphere” (Ponzio, 1994: 79-88, my translation). This 
dimension of alterity actually ties in with the second major use of Bakhtin in IR 
theory. 
Indeed, this second, and more substantial use of Bakhtinian thought is primarily 
focused on his “philosophical anthropology” (Todorov 1981: 145) and the 
preponderant place of the idea of dialogue within this framework. This impetus 
is naturally normative in its motivations whether it is directed at international 
relations as a field or as a discipline; it is concerned with what a dialogue 
between a self and difference is good for and what good it can attain (see, most 
notably, Der Derian 1993, Neumann 1996, 2003). This is what I characterised as 
the dialogic dimension. This relation is one in which to be a potential total and 
finite self is to be a being “which is unable not to participate in the event of co-
                                                        
5 A thoughtful treatment of IR theory’s usages of literary theory, among others Bakhtin’s, and its 
shortcomings can be found in Gerard Holden’s (2003) article “World Literature and World 
Politics: In Search of a Research Agenda.” 
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being,” the fact of being thus presupposing plurality (Nikulin, 1998: 395-396, 
emphasis added). It is therefore impossible to conceive a finite being as a totality 
outside the dynamics of the relations linking it to difference. There is no self per 
se nor can there be a self in isolation as a self cannot be total and finite; it is 
always relative to its position in the world, a world that only allows the self a 
limited perception of itself. For Bakhtin, to reach a relationally finite and total 
self would mean that one has to integrate through dialogue the vision that a 
multitude of other selves (alterity) possess of the world (see Bakhtin, 1990 
[1920-23]: 36). Most of the IR literature invested in bringing Bakhtin to the field 
and discipline considers that the only ethical way to talk of selves and difference 
is through the concept of a “dialogic” dialogue. 
Naturally, within IR, the ethical concern with regard to difference and the 
normative potential of the concept of dialogue has been present before and 
beside a direct Bakhtinian influence6. It is, however, striking to note that one of 
the main impetuses of their use of the notion of dialogue is originating from 
Tzvetan Todorov’s work, “the first fully fledged application of the self/other 
problematique to a historical discursive sequence” (Neumann, 1999: 22). It is 
worth remembering that Todorov was deeply influenced by Bakhtin (see 
Todorov, 1981). His well-known La conquête de l’Amérique, directly following 
his book on Bakhtin, is an example of the impact of Bakhtinian thinking on the 
French-Bulgarian scholar (see Todorov, 1982). This “Todorov link” in IR 
literature can be traced, for instance, in David Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah’s 
work7. For them, Todorov’s idea of “nonviolent communication,” along with 
Ashis Nandy’s notion of “dialogue of visions,” are necessary elements to start 
seeing difference as a subject, thus going beyond the mostly western conception 
of the other-as-object (see Blaney & Inayatullah, 1994). Todorov is also the main 
source for Inayatullah and Blaney’s genealogy of the problem of difference by 
paralleling Todorov’s methods of analysing European travelogues as they 
themselves examine several travelogues or thinkers of the sixteenth and 
                                                        
6 Such an example can be found in Thomas Risse’s (2000) adaptation of Jürgen Habermas’ 
communicative action framework to international relations. 
7 Another clear example of this influence is to be found in Richard Schapcott’s (2001) 
hermeneutical conception of communicative morality that shows a direct influence, among 
others, from Todorov. 
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seventeenth century (see Inayatullah & Blaney, 1996; 2004). 
Their project is both political and ethical, actually both terms are often directly 
linked (see, for instance, Inayatullah and Blaney 2004: 15, 22, 120), as they 
stress the importance of “the recovery of recessive themes and voices” to 
undermine “the naturalness of the dominant conceptions or conclusions of 
political and ethical traditions” and thus “reveals alternative conceptions and 
conclusions that may be turned against dominant understandings” (ibid.: 15). 
This stance aims at breaking with the “double movement,” when “difference 
becomes inferiority and the possibility of a common humanity requires 
assimilation” (ibid.: 10), a concept first laid out by Todorov, and is essentially a 
political stance, one that echoes Campbell’s or William Connolly’s whose analysis 
of the western (modern) intellectual framework to think about difference owes 
also to Todorov (see, for instance, Connolly, 1989). Yet, the “dialogical” dialogue 
might also be a venue to reflect on the political. In that respect, one cannot limit 
Bakhtin’s thought to the sole realm of the normative. Neumann (1999: 11-14, 16, 
21-22), for instance, considers that Bakhtin’s dialogism is “at least … the best 
starting point for the study of collective identity formation” (1999: 14), but 
ultimately fails to further developing this intuition by concentrating almost 
primarily on the mechanism of othering or by situating dialogism essentially in 
the realm of the normative. 
Others concur with the idea of a political relevance in Bakhtin’s conception of the 
human sciences (Bakhtin 1986 [1974]). Anthony Wall notes, in a review article 
on the links between Bakhtin and social sciences, that there is in Bakhtin’s 
writing a “rich social thinking that is both explicitly and implicitly present” (Wall, 
2001: 196); further, Bakhtin’s conception of dialogue “is not always the fruit of 
peaceful coexistence” as Bakhtin “is not a philosopher of the ideal speech 
situation and [he] is not a philosopher of agreement” (Wall, 1998: 205). This is 
quite obvious in Bakhtin’s concepts of carnival and parody, essential in his 
doctoral dissertation published in English as Rabelais and his World (Bakhtin, 
1984 [1965/1968]); this work not only shows an awareness of power relations 
existing between classes during the late Middle Ages and Renaissance, but also 
participate in Bakhtin account of contestational practices in societies and their 
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potential transformative power within either a society, in the form of “popular-
festive culture of laughter” (Hirschkop, 1999: 275-276, 283-285), or in a literary 
genre, such as the Menippean satire8 (see, as well, Gardiner, 1999; LaCapra, 
1999; Morson & Emerson, 1990: 433-470; Stallybrass & White, 1999). 
If it is true that Bakhtin’s work on carnival should be taken with caution in 
regard to some of its empirical and analytical aspects (Edwards 2002; LaCapra 
1999: 239), Bakhtin’s value, however, lies elsewhere. It lies in “his attempt to 
furnish a critical vision of society and culture in which the utopian dimension [of 
carnival] is a transfiguration of historical phenomena that keeps a viable 
connection with the requirements of institutionally structured social life” (ibid.: 
244). Ken Hirschkop goes further; in analysing the idea of fear in Bakhtin’s work 
on popular-festive cultures, Hirschkop remarks that “Bakhtin’s implicit claim is 
that we fail to comprehend [fear’s] power, or that of any other political 
formation, until we grasp it as a kind of historical world, a framework in which 
events acquire a meaning and significance transcending their immediacy” 
(Hirschkop, 1999: 274). In the end, since Bakhtin underlines key elements of 
social and political theory – contextuality, relationality, expressivity – and 
integrates them into context, relations and expression of power whether present 
in an almost face-to-face everyday life or through social and political institutions; 
it then situates elements of his work as both tackling the processual dimensions 
of the social and, as a consequence, its political dimensions as well. 
That is precisely what set the ideas of the dialogical process of identity formation 
as a heuristic instrument to identify the political dimension of the “international” 
taken as a process. To understand the political as an “expression of a particular 
structure of power relations” (Mouffe 2005: 18), is to comprehend it as a 
structuration, that is subject to challenging and conflicting utterances about what 
is the dominant “ordinary model of legitimacy” (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991: 
86-87) that unfolds the requirements necessary to satisfy a superior common 
principle in order to support justification. The political is the realm where 
different political grammars are conflicting to emerge as the relevant one, for 
                                                        
8 The Menippean satire is an antic “serio-comic genre which [according to Bakhtin] was one of 
the antecedents of the European novel, and which pioneered the novelistic parody of epic” 
(McGlathery, 2001: 119). 
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political grammars are “expressive vehicles for exemplary definitions of 
normalcy and deviance, recipes of duties and obligations, and syntaxes of self 
and other” (Brown 1987: 122). The political is reflective of a situation of 
heteroglossia (Bakhtin 1981 [1934-35]: 263, 270-275), where centripetal and 
centrifugal utterances are competing while living in “complex space-time 
configurations that are produced […] by different actors and are only able to 
reach relative, incomplete and temporary adjustments; they therefore are 
unachieved and open historical systems” (Bayart 1985: 351-352, my 
translation). 
Following Jean-François Bayart (1985: 354-355; see also Shapiro 1989: 81) in 
his article “Uttering the political”, one cannot but stress the quality of dialogism 
as a key concept allowing scholars to draw what are the differentiated and 
contending utterances over “the same institution, the same practice, the same 
narrative,” but to do so with an acute sense of the “historical situations and the 
clearly defined social field” in which these utterances are taking place. Political 
utterances are dialogically situated in a constellation of relations that are 
reflective of power relations (Foucault 2001 [1982]). These power relations, in 
turn, are fundamentally working through “the production and exchange of signs” 
(ibid.: 1055). Contentions and conflicts over particular issues or grammars are 
an indicator of the political because they allow drawing the constellation of 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses participating in the formation, 
performance and transformation of a collective political identity. As such, they 
are the reflection of contending and conflicting interpretations over their 
significance, and thus of differentiated collective self-understandings and 
representations. Moreover, from the perspective of IR theory, the delimitation of 
a constellation and the determination of the dialogical character of the different 
poles constituting it should result in a reflection over the relevance of the social 
and corporate identity division that informs and is pervasive in most IR theories 
interested in the identity/alterity nexus as well as the spatial underpinnings 
dominating such division (see Guillaume 2006, 2007). 
Beyond the corporate/social divide: theoretical considerations 
A central feature is common to most contemporary IR theories interested in the 
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identity/alterity nexus. To be theoretically understood, “identity” has to be 
comprehended following two broad spatial categories – corporate and social 
identity – delineating, and reproducing, the inside/outside divide that is at the 
heart of most theorization of the “international” (Walker 1993). My contention is 
that a dialogical understanding of the identity/alterity nexus, as it has been laid 
out elsewhere (Guillaume 2002, 2006, 2007), allows to go beyond the limitations 
this dichotomy fosters. Corporate identities are usually seen as ‘self-organizing, 
homeostatic structures that make actors distinct entities’ (Wendt 1999: 224-
225). Aelxander Wendt’s definition coincides indeed nicely with most IR theories 
conception of what is an ‘identity;’ the latter is seen as homologous to fixed state 
identities which are determined by exogenous factors. Corporate identities are 
unitary; they are uncompound and uncomplex social continuants which 
properties or preferences are taken as exogenous, in the sense of an ontological 
assumption regarding an entity’s ‘essence’ (Clark 1998: 248; Clunan 2000: 97-
98). This conception of corporate identity, therefore, is less analytical than 
categorial; it allows IR theorists to objectify certain social continuants as the 
conventional units of what now are categorially defined as international 
relations. They are analytically reified but as categories they are seen as 
interacting or, from a systemic point of view, as being positioned in a system that 
is precisely defined by this objectification. These units are constant through time, 
and might only differ between them by their properties and preferences that are 
taken exogenously from these monolithic units. Bluntly put, corporate identities 
are more or less black boxes, which reflect a rather static conception of what 
‘constitute’ international relations. 
Whereas corporate identity is generally taken as pre-social, reflecting either 
material capabilities or a certain Gestalt, the second analytical category, social 
identity, can either be seen as being meaningful through the type of interactions 
it leads to, whether one is a friend or a foe, a great power or a revisionist state, or 
by the fact that it is constituted socially through interactions, as it is proposed, 
for instance, in symbolic interactionism. Social identities can thus be defined as 
‘sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of 
others, that is, as a social object’ (Wendt 1994: 385). Within IR theory, social 
identity is generally considered the actual locus in/by which ‘identity’ can be 
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considered as an ‘independent variable’ that does the job or, differently put, as 
an explanans per se. Whatever the particular understanding of what is a social 
identity, the latter is usually seen as what is determining why and how a social 
continuant is acting in a certain expected way vis-à-vis others to fulfil the 
predicated behaviour its social identity entitled it to. Hence, social identities are 
conducive of normative behaviours; they are taken as explanans of a social 
continuant’s interactions with others. This dichotomy between social and 
corporate identities pertaining to a social continuant, while being a potentially 
good heuristic, is actually a rather incomplete characterization of the properties 
that are ontologically and epistemically defining what is and how is constituted 
this social continuant’s collective identity. I believe it is necessary to discuss 
whether a social continuant’s collective identity is an intrinsic or extrinsic 
property of the latter in order to underline the relevance of process-based 
approaches relatively to current theorizing of the identity/alterity nexus in IR 
theory.  
‘Identity,’ whether corporate or social, is an intrinsic property of a social 
continunant if it possesses it regardless of anything outside itself. If one takes 
two social continuants that are perfect duplicates, say two states having the same 
material capabilities in a situation of anarchy, then they ‘necessarily share 
intrinsic properties’ (McKritick 2003: 158); they literally are the same (see Waltz 
1979: 97-98, 127-128). In other words, to consider ‘identity’ as an intrinsic 
property is to consider ‘identity’ in an exogenous manner. Exogenity belongs to a 
form of reasoning unproblematising some social continuants as given, as 
assumptions or parameters (Cederman and Daase 2003: 6-7). In regard to 
corporate identity, it is to regard it as a self-organising and pre-social property of 
a social continuant; as mentioned this how IR theory generally tends to consider 
it. Intrinsicalness thus perpetuates the analytical assumption within IR theory of 
a ‘state of nature,’ a pre-social utopia demarcating a specific social continuant 
(generally the state) as an object situated outside any interactions with its 
environment. To say that a social identity is an intrinsic property of a social 
continuant is to assert that this social continuant will adopt certain behaviours 
or preferences in function of its inner characteristics and, in relation to its 
environment, in its interactions with other social continuants. While its 
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environment might prove crucial to determine which behaviour or preference is 
salient, it is not to say that its social identity is socially constituted. Such an 
argument, made explicitly by liberal and critical constructivists alike9, would 
consider social identity to be an extrinsic property. 
Overall, intrinsicalness participates in what Norbert Elias warned us against 
some thirty years ago, the tendency to use a ‘reifying mode of expression’ which 
in turn takes us to naturalise and crystallise continuants that are processual and 
dynamic in ‘essence,’ to individuate continuants that are relational in their 
agency and structure, and, finally, to essentialise, to the point of 
anthropomorphism, a continuant over others (Elias 1978: 13-32). To consider a 
social continuant’s corporate or social identity to be an intrinsic property results, 
logically, in the denial of the political quality of its formation, performance, or 
transformation. Intrinsicalness precludes ontologically the social constitution of 
either corporate or social identities. Intrinsicalness thus ignores the inherent 
role played by power relations – and thus contention, resistance or conflict – in 
the processes by which hegemonic and counter-hegemonic political grammars 
constitute the political community. To actually be able to make sense of the 
political, as an essential component of the identity/alterity nexus, one has to turn 
to the second category determining how the relations existing between identity 
and alterity are conceptualised within IR theory: extrinsicalness. 
An ‘identity’ is an extrinsic property of a social continuant if it is dependent 
‘wholly or partly on something other than that thing’ (Weberman 1999: 140). 
Contrary to the previous situation, if one takes two social continuants that are 
perfect duplicates, they ‘can differ with respect to their extrinsic properties’ 
(McKritick 2003: 158). To take again the previous example of two perfect 
duplicates, two states having the same material capabilities in a situation of 
anarchy, they can be different; somehow, they have to be different as their 
relations to various other identities will differ from each other according to 
numerous factors (e.g. geography, history, political system, and so on) and, 
                                                        
9 I hereby adopt Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit (1998) typology for its convenience in 
delineating two different ways to ‘endogenise’ constructivism in IR. I am naturally aware that as 
any typologies, Price and Reus-Smit’s has its limitations and either do injustice to some 
perspectives or actually reduce others for the sake of the typology. 
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simply, by the sheer number of possible and the complexity of trans-actions 
existing (Elias 1978: 14-15, 85, 100-103).  
For liberal constructivists, a social identity is regarded as an extrinsic 
property of a social continuant. A social identity, such as being a civilised state, 
comes to be and takes signification only if others recognize it as such. While 
one’s conception of being a civilised state might originate from one’s own 
conception of oneself, it is only through interactions that such a conception will 
be established or rebuked. Thus, liberal constructivism understands, mostly 
informed by symbolic interactionism as developed by George Herbert Mead and 
more recently by Herbert Blumer, a social identity to be formed through the 
socialization a state undergoes in a certain social environment; the state will take 
the value, will ‘mirror,’ the ‘identity’ others see it actually has (Wendt 1999: 326-
333). Within this perspective, however, whereas social identity is taken as an 
extrinsic property of the social continuant, corporate identity is still considered 
as an intrinsic one. While not denying boundary-drawing processes, as 
underlined by critical constructivists, liberal constructivists, however, locate this 
process, 
‘inside’ the space around which the boundary will be drawn. 
What makes, say Germany ‘Germany’ is primarily the agency 
and discourse of those who call themselves Germans, not the 
agency and discourse of outsiders. The Spanish state was a self-
organised, objective fact for the Aztecs, whether their discourse 
acknowledged this or not. (Wendt 1999: 74) 
One can note here a conflation between boundary-drawing processes with 
an assumed requirement that these processes are dependent upon actual 
‘outsiders’ (Rumelili 2004: 32-34). What is fundamentally missing here is the 
fact that alternative collective self-understandings/representations, both within 
and without a social continuant, are actually participating in the same general 
process of identity formation, performance and transformation (Guillaume 2002, 
2006). To use the oft cited illustration about Spain and the Aztecs, to understand 
what was Spain as a corporate actor requires to understand how a Spanish self-
understanding/representation was developed in the years of the Reconquista 
vis-à-vis ‘outsiders’ such as the Spanish Jews and the Moors (Kamen 1988a, 
 -16- 
1988b; Root 1988). This is a first and necessary step to then understand how 
Spain’s ‘corporate identity’ interacted with the Aztecs through their ‘social 
identities,’ despite this event being often considered as a first encounter.10 Many 
constructivists are neglecting a fundamental dimension of symbolic 
interactionism, which are the actual possibility of contestation and the ongoing 
negotiation of social identities between social continuants (Rumelili 2002: 59; 
Aboulafia: 11). In other words, something must happen within the corporate 
identity for the process of socialization to succeed or fail. One might in effect 
resist the social identity that one’s generalized other sees one has. 
This has been the case, for instance, of Tokugawa Japan’s resistance to the 
traditional East Asian tributary system centred on China, which would have 
determined the social identity of Tokugawa Japan as a tributary state. Instead, 
the Tokugawa regime sought to differentiate itself from this traditional 
conception of the East Asian system and, by resisting to this representation in its 
relations to China, Korea and the Ryūkyū (Okinawa), tried to provide an 
alternative and competing view through a series of domestic and international 
efforts to sustain this alternative self-understanding and representation (Toby 
1991[1984]). The case of post-war Germany is also telling. While, in effect, the 
Germans were at the source of their post-war ‘corporate identity,’ the latter 
could only be understood by the intervention of ‘outsiders,’ such as the Allied 
countries. Thus, it seems evident that there is a process not only coming from the 
corporate identity to the social one, but also from the latter to the former. The 
impact of the past and memory on an identity, and the influence of ‘outsiders’ in 
this impact, as the German case clearly exemplifies, is also an important element 
to take into account (see Pommerin 1995). 
To distinguish analytically between a corporate and social identity thus 
seems more and more artificial and categorial. In effect, if one is to consider 
‘identity’ to be a process, then it calls into question the relevance, and underlines 
the artificiality, of the categorial division between corporate and social identities. 
                                                        
10 This idea of a ‘first encounter’ as a time zero in a trans-action is a myth for there is no such 
things as a time zero in an encounter; there are always previous actual or imaginary conceptions 
of what difference is shaping this ‘first encounter’; on ‘first encounter’ as time zero (see Wendt 
1992: 401, 404n47).  
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This artificiality stems principally from the distinction between two ‘variables’ 
that actually are participating in the same process. In effect, one can readily 
question the unstated assumption that no, or limited, influences exist between 
the corporate identity of a social continuant and its social identities; in effect, if a 
corporate identity is intrinsic to that continuant, then it is not, necessarily, 
influenced by its relations with other social continuants at the ‘corporate level.’11 
Following Norbert Elias (1978: 112-116), this distinction of an actual process 
into two distinct and individuated components can be called ‘process-reduction,’ 
by which the ‘possible separation of interrelated things into individual 
components – ‘variables’ or ‘factors’ – without any need to consider how such 
separate and isolated aspects of a comprehensive context are related to each 
other’ is made possible. Moreover, ‘[a]t all events, the relationship appears to be 
an afterthought, an addition, tacked on later to intrinsically unrelated and 
isolated objects’. Further, this distinction brackets as well the eventness of 
international relations. In other words, this distinction fails to integrate 
theoretically the relations between an inside and an outside; it artificially creates 
such boundaries. 
This onto-epistemic denial of the processual character “all the way down” of 
identity formation, performance or transformation is also a denial of the political 
character of such phenomenon. Indeed, IR theories that concentrate on either 
social or corporate identity ultimately fail to identify the relevant constellations 
of utterances that are participating in the processual constitution of collective 
identities. They fail because they do not integrate, from an onto-epistemic 
perspective, the fundamentally multi-layered character of the processes of 
identity formation, performance or transformation into a non-exclusive and 
integrated framework that allows taking into account the heteroglossia at the 
core of such processes. As it will be shown bellow, corporate and social identities 
are so intertwined empirically in the process of utterances of different and 
contending collective self-understandings/representations that their categorial 
distinction can only at best truncate, at worst depoliticize, processes that are 
reflective of dynamic and evolving power relations. Extrinsicalness allows, for its 
                                                        
11 A more detailed discussion about intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is to be found in Guillaume 
2006. 
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part, to consider the dialogical quality of the identity/alterity nexus for it takes 
into account and mediates between the potentially complex constellations of 
trans-actions existing. Most notably, it does so, through a dialogical framework, 
by considering the variety of utterances contending for dominance within a 
policy, by avoiding process-reduction and, finally, by considering how this 
variety might constitute a series of constellations of trans-actions, each defined 
by different contextuality, relationality and expressivity (see Guillaume 2002, 
2006). 
Beyond the corporate/social divide: the Japanese political community 
With the emergence, around the late eighteenth century, of a horizontal 
conception of the political community, questions of cultural differences, 
understood broadly, became pro-eminent in Japan from the second half of the 
nineteenth century then on. Indeed, questions such as the possible integration of 
peripheral communities, deemed external to “Japan,”12 such as the Ainu or 
Ryūkyūan (Okinanwan), other pertaining to the historical foundation of the 
horizontal national community (such as the “outcasts,” the burakumin), or those 
linked to the colonial expansion of the Meiji regime were all informed at a level 
or another by the prolématique of multiculturalism. What is especially 
interesting to note in light of a dialogical understanding is the fact that most of 
these conceptions were generally informed by different understandings and 
representations of what a Japanese national identity was. In other words, by the 
second half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century, competing 
utterances about the Japanese political community were expressed and 
articulated offering a wide range of figurations of alterity. This situation of 
heteroglossia, whether directed within or without the polity, reflected 
alternative dialogical constitution of a Japanese self-
understanding/representation not only vis-à-vis Asia but also vis-à-vis the west. 
A recent path breaking analysis has shown that these evolving hegemonic 
self-understandings/representations were the result of several factors such as 
the more competing and insecure international environment, the intellectual 
                                                        
12 Amino Yoshihiko (1992) has provided us with an extensive discussion of the contexts and 
circumstances through which the term “Japan” has taken pre-eminence while being at heart a 
very contingent notion. 
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environment of late Tokugawa and Meiji eras, the increasing perception by 
political and intellectual elites of the existence of a “Japanese” population and of 
the necessity to think of it as a society and as a nation, the sense of a moving 
periphery within and around the main isles (the Ainu, the Ryūkyūan, the 
Taiwanese, as well as the Korean and Chinese), as well as the development of an 
imperialist ideology paralleling the development of Japan as a regional power in 
the late nineteenth century (see Oguma 2002 (1995)). All of these factors are 
pertaining both to the corporate (e.g. the shift from a vertical to a horizontal 
sense of the community) and social (e.g. Japan as an imperial and civilized 
power) identities of Japan. However, from the “corporate” level, it is difficult, on 
the one hand, to ignore the impact of external influences to the Japanese drive to 
reach a social identity as a civilised power, in order to be recognised by the 
western power as fully part of the international system, on utterances about the 
shape and scope of the Japanese political community. On the other hand, from 
the “social” level, it is difficult to dissociate Japan’s civilisational and imperial 
drive behind its imperial expansion from discourses and policies at home about 
the form of the collective political identity. By discussing the contexts, 
expressions and relationalities that were at the core of two key contending 
articulations of this political community and identity, I hope to show that such a 
corporate/social divide is in effect a form of process-reduction decried by Elias. 
To follow Oguma Eiji’s work (Oguma 2002[1995], see as well Askew 
2001), one can identify, from the mid-nineteenth to the end of the Second World 
War, two key articulations of the Japanese political community: either as a 
“mixed nation,” the fruit of the encounter of an original population living on the 
isles and a conqueror coming from the continent, or as an ethnically 
homogeneous nation from primeval times. Despite their different 
understandings and representations of the Japanese political community, both 
sides agreed on the multicultural character of the Japanese polity; the fact that 
there were populations which were not “ethnically” Japanese (Ainu, Ryūkyūan, 
Korean, Taiwanese) yet part of the empire or the mere existence of culturally 
differentiated groups whether through their religious loyalties (Shintoists, 
Buddhists, Christians) or through their social ones (peasants, and especially the 
“outcasts”) was recognised by both sides. This point, the acknowledgement and 
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recognition of the heterogeneous character of the Japanese polity at that time, is 
crucial as it rebukes the stereotypical view that the dominant vision articulated 
in Japan was already that of an homogeneous population. 
This recognition can be said to be partially the fruit of the colonial 
development of the Meiji regime in eastern Asia and the burgeoning of schools of 
thought in the nineteenth century. Interestingly, this “external” phenomenon, 
colonial expansion, was matched both with external and internal figurations of 
alterity, participating more generally in politics of alterity, that were oriented 
either toward an assimilationist position or an anti-assimilationist one. The 
assimilationist position, usually informed by proponents of the “mixed nation” 
theory, held a position which can be roughly epitomized as mission civilisatrice, 
pleading for the assimilation of peripheral and external populations to the 
Japanese polity, while the anti-assimilationist position, usually informed by 
proponents of the “homogeneous nation” theory, held a position of strict 
compartmentalization of each populations. While directed to the “orient,” to 
subverted and subjected Asian populations, these figurations and politics of 
alterity, participated fully in a dialogical relation with the west. Indeed, one can 
note a subtle dialogue vis-à-vis the west in both the assimilationist and anti-
assimilationist discourses. Moreover, the adopted Japanese colonial policies 
implemented, ruthlessly, both an assimilationist and an anti-assimilationist 
stance to the subverted populations.  
What were the contexts surrounding these utterances? In regard to the 
question of the formation and performance of a “national” identity, it is clear that 
they revolved around the question of multiculturalism; that is to say to which 
extent is the Japanese polity made of, or should recognised being made of, 
several cultural entities and to which extent this is a good or a bad thing (see, for 
instance, Denoon et al. 1996; Clammer 2001; Oguma 2002 [1995]). It is clear that 
most modern societies are multicultural, in the sense of a social fact of the 
presence and interactions within a bounded polity of culturally differentiated 
groups. The (non/mis)recognition of this social fact can result in very different 
policies and different articulations of a hegemonic discourse about identity 
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which, along a normative continuum, can be either inclusive or exclusive of 
difference. 
The Japanese case is particularly interesting in that it has often been 
represented, and understood, as a monocultural, homogenous and harmonious 
society. Strikingly, this form of representation and understanding has been 
recurrent in Japan and outside. However, whether socially, culturally, or 
ethnically, Japan was and still is diverse, multiform, and conflictual (see Krauss et 
al. 1984; Lie 2001). Socially, for instance, few major issues can be singled out 
here. One was the political and social protests, and popular unrests, during the 
Tokugawa era. The mere existence of these “peasant protests,” according to 
James W. White (1995: 6-7), “belies the old stereotype of a uniquely harmonious 
Japanese society.” A major factor in such social (especially) and political unrests 
have been the economical transformations of Tokugawa’s Japan into a more 
commercial and protoindustrial society as well as the problems related to a very 
loose form of governance that was characterized by “the fragmentation of 
jurisdictions and inconsistency of administrative practice and capability across 
jurisdictions” (White 1995: 29).  
From a cultural point of view, it is interesting to pinpoint first to the place 
of Christianity in Japanese history. Christianity has been a major force in 
determining many key features of the Tokugawa institutions such as the Danka 
system, a system of affiliation of temples and households at the heart of the 
Tokugawa regime control of the population (Hur 2007; Marcure 1985). Even in 
contemporary Japan, while it remains a marginal element within Japanese 
society, Christianity “has had a profound, but ambiguous impact on Japanese 
politics, education, literature and even on the organization and practices of the 
indigenous religions themselves” (Clammer 2001: 164). Buddhism itself, while 
being a fundamental element within Japanese history, has fluctuated in its 
positioning, during the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods, as a core element 
of a hegemonic discourse about Japanese self-understanding/representation. As 
James E. Ketelaar (1990) has shown, during the early years of the Meiji era, 
Buddhism was cast as an “external” and “backward” force to Japan’s 
development as a modern nation and was fiercely and ruthlessly fought for a 
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while. Naturally, modernity itself became a sensitive discussion from the late 
Tokugawa to the early Shōwa periods (see, for instance, Minichiello 1998; 
Harootunian 2000). 
Ethnically, finally, modern and contemporary Japan can be described as 
having faced or facing multicultural issues and tensions. Among the most known 
issues is the one faced by the Japanese polity as an empire. Whatever the 
questions that can be asked about the monoethnic character of the “Japanese”, 
Japan’s expansion to the north and the south during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries made it to include, respectively, Ainu and Ryūkyūan to its 
realm; moreover, the forceful integration of Taiwan and Korea made Japan a de 
facto multicultural polity by the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 
twentieth century (see, for instance, Ching 2001; Lie 2001; Oguma 2002(1995)). 
Through this interaction with difference, the Meiji state as well as its 
successors came to enact policies towards Korean, Chinese/Taiwanese, Ainu, or 
Ryūkyūan that reflected not only the hegemonic utterance of the time but also 
the contending utterances about the scope and shape of the Japanese political 
community. In effect, one can argue that in the process of identity formation 
different figurations of alterity might well exist but the figuration of inversion is 
the strongest, the one that has the deepest impact on this process. Non-othered 
forms of figurations are but normative moments requiring the emancipation of 
singular self-understanding/representation from the “structural temptation” of 
othering (see Connolly 1991: 8)13. Yet, the debates about and policies related to 
the Japanese imperial project show a much more complicated picture. First, we 
see an evolution of the figurations at play regarding the dominant self-
understanding/representation in Japan; from a perception that is constructed as 
mainly monocultural one can perceive a shift to a more multicultural 
construction which then evolve again into a monocultural one (Oguma 2002 
[1995]). Second, a striking feature of this evolution is the way this dominant self-
understanding/representation was always in interaction with specific 
alternatives, often blurred into a mixture of imagined or actual presences, such 
as China or the west. Third, this evolution not only shows that there are different 
                                                        
13 A critical account of the preponderance of the figure of inversion and of othering in IR theory 
cab be found in Guillaume forthcoming. 
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potentially dominant self-understanding/representation that are at struggle to 
becoming the defining hypergood but that once this position is attained it does 
not necessarily follow a secure and stable dominion over the alternative ones 
(see Guillaume 2006). 
With the Meiji restoration came the impulse to compete with the west in 
order to regain the country’s independence lost by the signature of the unequal 
treaties which provided westerners with the ability to regulate Japanese trade 
and with extraterritoriality in Japan (see Cortazzi, 1999). To compete with the 
west meant for many at the time to be like the west, to become a civilisation and 
to become an enlightened country. Western experts were hired at great expanses 
to teach the Japanese western institutions, technologies and sciences, Japanese 
elites were send abroad to observe and learn directly from the west and efforts 
were made to westernise the country’s political institutions, economy, 
technology and social mores. The first decades of the Meiji regimes were defined 
under the slogan bunmei kaika [civilisation and enlightenment] and this period 
is crucial to understand the new conditions of possibility created in an 
articulation of the Japanese political community that was participating in a 
conscious dialogue with the west as a resource for creating and promoting a 
strong and wealthy Japanese polity capable of resisting the west, a civilized Japan 
but not necessarily a modern one. 
Indeed, the Japanese “westernisers” were, in the words of Douglas R. 
Howland (2001: 2, my emphasis), “much more enthusiastic about translating 
political concepts [coming from the west] than they were about practicing them;” 
indeed, the “Japanese efforts to translate the West must be understood both as 
problems of language–the creation and circulation of new concepts–and as 
problems of action–the usage of new concepts in debates about the policies to be 
implemented in a westernising Japan.” These efforts were linked with the widely 
shared perceptions that to avoid what other Asian countries (especially China 
and India) were suffering from western aggressions it was necessary to come to 
par with the “civilized nations” of the west. Influential thinkers such as 
Fukuzawa Yukichi and Katō Hiroyuki were keen on adopting and adapting 
European conceptions of progress, most notably Herbert Spencer’s (see 
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Howland, 2000) and Charles Darwin’s (see Unoura, 1999), in order to promote a 
conception of Japan as detached from its Asian neighbours and as competing for 
attaining an equal status with its western competitors (see Tanaka, 1993: 37-38, 
46-47). In the famous words of Fukuzawa in his 1885 essay Datsu-A ron 
[Dissociation from Asia]: 
We cannot wait for our neighbor countries to become so 
civilized that all may combine together to make Asia progress. 
We must rather break out of formation and behave in the same 
way as the civilized countries of the West are doing … We would 
do better to treat China and Korea in the same way as do the 
Western nations. (as quoted in Miyoshi, 1994: 53) 
While this can be seen as a strong affirmation for a Japanese imperial 
project, it is rather to be primarily seen as a form of rupture in a tentative and 
alternative articulation of a Japanese self-understanding/representation. Indeed, 
by envisioning the political community “horizontally,” the early Meiji scholars, 
inspired by western liberal thinkers, equally offered such a rupture by 
considering Japan’s polity in a temporally driven dynamic rather than in a 
spatially driven one. Bunmei [civilisation] replaced the Chinese notion of ka 
[civilised centre] in the Meiji era to come defining Japan’s place in the hierarchy 
of nations (Morris-Suzuki, 1998a: 24-25). This transition was impacting on 
Japan’s “corporate” and “social” identities. During the Tokugawa era, the regime 
tried to decentre itself from the Chinese ka to constitute its own spatially-centred 
sovereignty by creating a network of either equal or tributary relations with its 
neighbours (see Toby, 1991 [1984]). During the Meiji era, the “centre” was not 
only, and certainly not primarily, spatially defined but temporally so, indeed 
“Unlike ka, bunmei was a dynamic concept laden with overtones of progress. Its 
basis was not harmony and hierarchy but production: the ability to create 
material wealth which would release the human spirit from the bonds imposed 
on it by nature” (Morris-Suzuki, 1998a: 24). 
Fukuzawa’s 1875 (1973 [1875]) Outline of a Theory of Civilization 
precisely illustrates what are the stages of developments a nation has to face in 
order to become a civilized one. The referent was not anymore China but the 
civilized west; the orient was cast as Japan’s other while (western) civilization 
was cast as its future (see Sakamoto, 2001: 142-152; Tanaka, 1993). Fukuzawa’s 
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refrain in his Datsu-A ron could not be more explicit: “leave Asia and enter 
Europe” (Howell, 2000: 115-116). For Fukuzawa, Japan had to become civilized 
because to attain this condition was the only secure way to preserve its 
independence for western powers would only consider Japan as an equal 
sovereign state if Japan was recognised as a civilised nation by them. 
Furthermore, Fukuzawa asserted, the adoption of western civilization was the 
only way to preserve not only Japan’s independence but also Japan’s kokutai, its 
national essence. This mimetic stance should not be simply taken as the act of 
un-critically copying another’s practices; in this context, mimesis should be seen 
as an “operator for putting in relations” the terms of a dialogue (see Ossman, 
1998: 10). Indeed, if one takes the case of Taiwan’s colonisation in particular, or 
the issue of colonialism more generally, the key question to ask is not “whether 
Japanese colonial discourse is the same as or ‘different’ from Western colonial 
discourse,” but rather to ask the question of “the enunciative position in which 
that identity or difference is articulated and configured in reference to the 
instituted differences between ‘Japan’ and ‘others’” (Ching, 2001: 27, my 
emphasis; see as well Duus, 1995: 424-438). 
As is clear in the writings of key figures of the early Meiji era such as 
Fukuzawa, the discourse of “civilization,” of the west, was omnipresent in Japan 
(for an overview see Sansom, 1977 [1950]: chapters 14 and 15). Moreover, “The 
West was necessarily a part of the future [Japanese people] imagined ... The 
world the Western powers were then creating–the world of industry and 
imperialism, trade and technology–was the future, whether the Japanese liked it 
or not” (Howell, 2000: 86, original emphasis). The “process of civilization” and 
the idea of progress evolved from a discourse originating in and derived from the 
west to a “naturalized” discourse as “First, [civilization] acquired the adjectives 
‘new’ or ‘Japanese’ before it, and then it shed even those. By the end of the [Meiji] 
period, ‘civilization’ appeared as an indigenous fact of social life that possessed 
the same descriptive transparency as any unmodified common noun” (Gluck, 
1985: 254). “Civilization” was internalised as participating in figurations of 
alterity inasmuch as it was used to determine alternative self-
understandings/representations through this prism. 
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Internationally, the Japanese self-understanding/representation promoted 
by the Meiji regime tended to put forward the idea that it participated in, or had 
to seek, the status of “civilized nation” in order to exit its condition of a subaltern 
country, following the signature of the unequal treaties, and be recognised as 
fully part of the international system. Furthermore, this dominant self-
understanding/representation was set aside from what was considered as the 
“un-civilized” and “barbaric” Asians. This process of dissociation, illustrated by 
Fukuzawa’s Datsu-A ron, was paralleled with the construction of the east, the 
orient (tōyō) as Japan’s past and the west as its future (see Tanaka, 1993). This 
dialogical definition of a national community turned to the outside was 
paralleled domestically by efforts to westernise the country and the population 
as well as the articulation of “ideological fictions like kunmin ikka [the ruler and 
the people as one family] and kazoku kokka [the family-state]” (Irokawa, 1985 
[1970]: 259); these efforts and articulations were all participating in a growing 
attempt to normalise the Japanese polity and society, an attempts that peaked in 
the 1920s and 1930s. 
This redefinition of what it meant to be “Japanese” impacted on the 
relationship with populations, which were thought, in the Tokugawa era, to be 
outside or foreign from Japan. Indeed, Ainu and Ryūkyūan came to be thought as 
Japanese of a kind, the question raised being that of their integration to the 
dominant self-understanding/representation in light of their differences to it. 
This question of multiculturalism was furthermore present in the mind of 
Japanese at the turn of the nineteenth century as they faced the prospect of the 
integration of foreign populations located in colonies into a formal Japanese 
empire (see Morris-Suzuki, 1998a, 1998b; Oguma, 2002 [1995]). As the first 
instance of an “external colonisation,” Taiwan was a showcase in Japanese trans-
action with the west in term of its emerging self-understanding/representation 
as a modern/civilised political community as well as in the politics to alterity vis-
à-vis a difference deemed both close and distant from this emerging collective 
identity (see Matsuda, 2003). Indeed, the Taiwanese difference, as a colonial 
subject, made even more crucial the question of Japanese relations to 
multiculturalism in the context of its empire. What were the relations between 
this modern and civilised polity and its subordinated populations? What made 
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Japan (di)similar from other modern and civilised polities? What did it mean to 
be Japanese in regards to populations that were integrated in this polity? What 
was their place in the polity? Were their nationhood Japanese (minzoku)? Were 
they participating in the Japanese polity (kokumin, i.e. as citizens) for they might 
adopt Japanese culture thus defining themselves as Japanese?  
The imperialist project as well as the actual acquisition of colonies by the 
Meiji state led to a very simple problematic for Japanese scholars and 
intellectuals: what was making the Japanese nation? The question was to know 
what was the place of the colonized in the Japanese empire. Interestingly, this 
question was echoing and came to be intertwined with an earlier debate among 
those who were perceiving that in order to reach its goal of maintaining its 
fragile independence and modernising as well as strengthening its state, the 
Meiji regime had not only to achieve its civic (formal) definition, somewhat 
achieved with the adoption of the Meiji constitution and the opening of the Diet 
by the end of the 1880’s, but as well its national (substantial) definition. What 
was feared, to use Carol Gluck’s (1985: 21-26) term, was that the Meiji’s subjects 
were lacking a “sense of nation.”  
These questions were made even more acute as the population that 
started to be aggregated to the Japanese polity were geographically, culturally 
and historically contiguous to the Japanese frontiers. To take but one of the best 
example of this would be the incorporation of the Ryūkyūan kingdom into the 
Japanese polity. The Kingdom of Ryūkyū was participating in the Chinese 
tributary system since at least the fourteenth century and had contacts with the 
Satsuma clan in Southern Kyushu. The latter invaded parts of the kingdom in 
1609 and thus began for the kingdom “Ryūkyū’s period of ‘dual subordination’ to 
Satsuma and the Bakufu, on the one hand, and Qing (after 1644) China on the 
other” (Siddle 1998: 118). The kingdom was indeed integrated, at least partially, 
in the Tokugawa bakufu’s world order, despite being a possession of the Satsuma 
clan, for in integrating Ryūkyū into that system the Tokugawa regime tried to 
depict the kingdom as a vassal state to its own tributary system, thus legitimising 
its newly acquired political authority by constructing and promoting, both 
 -28- 
international and domestically, the vision of such a world order centred on Japan 
(see Toby 1991 [1984]: 45-52). 
With the Meiji restoration came the full integration of Ryūkyū as Okinawa 
in 1879, as a prefecture of the Japanese territory. Despite its status as a 
prefecture, Okinawa was treated differently than other prefectures as it was 
more or less treated as a protectorate by the Meiji state (see Siddle 1998: 121-
123). Moreover, the status of Okinawan became a problem of its own as the 
question of their status as “nationals” came to the fore. Indeed, as noted by Julia 
Yonetani (2000: 30), “Contentious over divergent and often ambiguous 
constructions of ‘sameness’ reflected ambivalent fluctuations between 
articulations of Japanese nation and empire, and over Okinawa’s place within a 
protean Japan.” In facing these new imperial citizens, the Japanese polity was 
confronted with a dilemma. Indeed, “The ruling state’s urge to exalt and spread 
the values of its own ‘civilisation’ contended with its desire to maintain the 
differences that justified unequal access to power” (Morris-Suzuki 1998: 161). 
How this dilemma was considered depended upon the either nativist or 
multiculturalist framework that was adopted to understand this “new” reality for 
the Japanese polity. Interestingly, each of these framework adopted specific 
figurations of alterity in order to convey what they sought was the best way to 
achieve the “national polity,” the kokutai (see Guillaume 2003). 
Conclusion 
Discourses and practices about the kokutai, as an “external” and “internal” 
Weltanschauung, participate in a heteroglossia pertaining to the shape and scope 
of the national political community. Different and contending collective self-
understandings/representations of this community impacted on the ways both 
policies at home and abroad were shaped and conducted, whether toward a 
more “internal” alterity, such as the Ainu or the Ryūkyūan, or a more “external” 
alterity, such as the Taiwanese and the Koreans (see Guillaume 2006 for a 
synthetic view). One of the key political grammars that were used by all 
participating in this “production and exchange of signs” (Foucault 2001 [1982]: 
1055) about the kokutai was that of civilization. The omnipresence of this 
political grammar, both in “internal” and “external” discourses and practices, and 
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the genealogy of its use by different and contending collective self-
understandings/representations illustrates concretely the process-reduction 
fallacy that would characterise any attempts to divide an analysis of a Japanese 
identity formation, performance and transformation into either a corporate 
perspective or a social perspective. Moreover, the essentially extrinsic quality of 
this phenomenon furthers the case for privileging process-based because of its 
capability to comprehend how the political is working in such phenomenon by 
stressing the “unachieved and open” (Bayart 1985: 355) character of the trans-
actions among utterances that are at the core of the understanding, expression 
and representation of a collective political community.  
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